

Copy No. 18

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
3 December 1954

TO: Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT: Implications of Moscow conference calls for combined
East European military command

Creation of a combined command for the military forces of East Europe, as apparently threatened following ratification of the Paris agreements, would have no immediate effect on the direct control maintained by the Soviet Union over all activities of Satellite armed forces. It might, however, offer some administrative and other advantages over Moscow's present bilateral system of control.

The principal security agreements now in force in East Europe are a series of bilateral mutual defense pacts among the Satellites and a series tying each Satellite (except Albania) to the USSR. The 2 December communique points toward the inclusion of all East European states, including East Germany, Albania and the USSR, in a multilateral arrangement.

Until now, the USSR has favored the bilateral approach in its dealings with Satellite military forces, controlling them individually through sizable military missions, and in the case of Poland, even Soviet commanders. These controls will remain in force. There has already been a general standardization of Satellite military equipment, organization, tactics, training and conscription methods on the Soviet model.

New combined staffs could include, under Soviet generalship, regional or "Front" commands in such combinations as that of Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany, and Soviet forces in those countries. Both Czech Premier Siroky and East German Premier Grotewohl hinted at a future regional arrangement in speeches declaring that Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany were especially threatened by West German "remilitarization." Following ratification of the Paris

Document No. 17
No Change in Class. ☒
☐ Declassified
Class. Changed To: TS S C

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agreements, the development of a strong East German military establishment might additionally be justified if its forces were included in a regional command. It is noteworthy that the final conference communique did not repeat Grotewohl's threat to "create national armed forces" in East Germany, although the threat remains implicit since Grotewohl was a signatory to the communique.

Creation of a combined command could have certain political advantages within the Satellites in line with recent evidence of a more sophisticated Soviet-Satellite relationship. Under a new, multilateral arrangement, the continued presence of Soviet troops in Poland, Hungary and Rumania could be made less objectionable to the Satellite peoples and the entrance of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria could be justified. If handled carefully by the USSR, with consideration for national sensibilities, a combined command could give Satellite military officers a sense of participation in joint planning and could be a factor in improving morale.

The creation of a combined command alone would entail negligible additional expense to the Satellites or the USSR, and therefore would not disrupt any of the long-term economic programs now under way in the Orbit. 25X1

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